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Foreword 
This publication comes out of the Strategic Program for Research on Globalization and 
Internationalization: welfare, work, legitimacy and globalization, at the Stein Rokkan Centre for 
Social Studies at Bergen University Research Foundation. This program is designed as a 
University of Bergen research network, and its primary area of activity is the study of 
changes in welfare and labor market institutions as they are played out in the debate on 
globalization and internationalization.  
Issues of distribution, regulation and fairness are central to the program, which 
incorporates research in sociology, political science, economics, history and philosophy. 
One basic premise for program research is that focusing on welfare and labor market 
institutions can provide important insights into other areas of society and that it can also 
shed light on other globalization issues, such as the status of the nation state and 
conditions for democratic governance. 
The paper was presented at a workshop in Pretoria, South Africa in February 2003, 
as a contribution to the research project “Developing anormative framework for 
effective and efficient social security provisioning: an institutional perspective”, financed 
by The Research Council of Norway and The National Research Foundation, South 
Africa. The project, (2002–2005), is a cooperative project between the Rokkan Centre 
and The Centre for International Law and Comparative Labour and Social Secuirty Law, 
Rand Afrikaans University, Johennesburg. The author wishes to thank the participants 
of the workshop for valuable comments.  
 
 
 
Rune Ervik has a dr.polit degree in political science from the University of Bergen. He 
works as a researcher at the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies within the 
Globalization Program. 
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Summary 
This paper identifies and describes the normative content of ideas concerning pension 
systems/social security schemes in terms of the concepts of fairness or justice laid out 
by two selected international organisations: the World Bank and the ILO. In this 
context, these organisations are regarded as setting global normative standards and as 
acting in ways that influence local powers to adopt policies that accord with these ideas. 
The focus is on the ideas implicit in policy stories, i.e. on the frameworks of 
understanding within which problems are specifically identified, their causes singled out, 
and remedies pursued. Three factors crucial to an understanding of the concepts of 
distributive justice that underlie these organisations are discussed: the coverage or scope 
of the pension system, redistribution, and the adequacy of pensions. The paper then 
presents the institutional framework of pension provision in Norway and provides a 
brief account of the South African system. On the basis of these four cases, the paper 
concludes with a comparative normative account of these frameworks and a description 
of various contrasts and similarities.  
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Samandrag 
Dette notatet identifiserar og diskuterar det normative innhaldet i idear om 
pensjonssystem med omsyn til rettferdsforståingar slik desse blir lagt fram av to 
internasjonale organisasjonar; Verdsbanken og ILO. Desse organisasjonane blir her sett 
som globale normative standard settarar. Dei er aktørar som prøver å påverke lokale 
makthavarar til å tilpasse seg slike standardar i politikkutforminga. Fokus ligg på idear 
forstått som policy historier, det vil seie eit rammeverk for forståing som inneheld  
problemidentifisering, årsaksforståing og løysingsforslag. Diskusjonen her er konsentrert 
om tre aspekt som er sentrale i høve til å forstå fordelingsrettferdskonsepsjonen til desse 
organisasjonane: medlemsskapsomfang, omfordeling og substansielt omfang til 
pensjonane. Notatet syner så den institusjonelle utforminga av pensjonssystemet i 
Noreg og gir ei kort framstilling av det Sør Afrikanske systemet. Ut frå desse fire døma 
konkluderer notatet gjennom ei komparativ samanstilling av desse normative 
rammeverka for å få fram kontrastar og likskapar. 
  7
Introduction  
The aims of this paper are threefold. Firstly, to identify and describe the normative 
content of ideas about pension systems/social security schemes in terms of the concepts 
of fairness or justice laid out by two selected international organisations. The discussion 
will focus on three factors: the coverage or scope of the pension system, redistribution, 
and the adequacy of pensions. These aspects are crucial to an understanding of the 
concepts of distributive justice that underlie these organisations.  
The second aim is to describe in some detail the present institutional framework of 
pension provision in Norway and to provide a brief account of the South African 
system.  
Thirdly, on the basis of these four cases, the paper concludes with a comparative 
normative account of these frameworks and a description of various contrasts and 
similarities.  
I shall start with the premise that there exist certain global ideas concerning pension 
models, and that international institutions act so as to influence local powers to adopt 
policies that accord with these ideas. The focus is on the ideas implicit in policy stories, 
i.e. on the frameworks of understanding within which problems are specifically 
identified, their causes singled out, and remedies pursued.    
“Like any good yarn, policy stories have settings (the basic assumptions), villains 
(the policy problem and who or what is causing them), heroes (the policy solution 
and who or what should be responsible), and, of course, a road leading to a happy 
end (concrete prescriptions for reform). Each contribution tells a slightly different 
story of the same issue: each identifies problems, apportions blame, and claims to 
provide solutions. Each story combines factual observation with fundamental 
beliefs about how to best manage pension systems” (Ney 2000). 
Such policy stories are visible at different levels of social scale from the micro to the 
macro and global levels. It is at the international level that we shall begin, by presenting 
some central normative components of the policy stories of the World Bank and the 
ILO. In this context I shall concentrate mostly on the solution or the prescribed happy 
end of the policy story. 
Two global normative pe rspectives on 
redistr ibutive fairness of  pensions 
Laid out below are two normative perspectives on fair pensions, the first based on a 
well-known World Bank report and the second on an ILO story derived from an 
executive summary of the ILO viewpoint. Before proceeding, it is important to stress 
that in the current article the views of these organisations are probably portrayed as 
more ideologically homogeneous than they really are. Both organisations do in fact 
manifest contradictory and competing views, which means that they are in reality more 
pluralist than they are made out to be here.  
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T h e  W o r l d  B a n k   
The World Bank report Averting the Old Age Crisis has been influential in setting pension 
reform agendas and influencing pension reforms in different countries. The discursive 
impact of the report has been global in scope, representing the economic attitude of the 
neo-liberal establishment (MacKellar 2000, Deacon, with Hulse and Stubbs 1997). The 
basic premise of the World Bank is the need for economic growth:  
“Everybody, old and young, depends on the current output of the economy to 
meet current consumption needs, so everybody is better off when the economy is 
growing – and in trouble when it’s not” (World Bank 1994, p. 3). 
For the World Bank, there is a need to link the role of the pension system to the need 
for economic growth. A pension system that avoids market distortions and thereby 
promotes growth is good for the economy. Ultimately, a bigger pie is better for 
everyone, including the old. The report describes a situation in which both informal 
(non-public and non-market institutions) and formal (read public) old-age programs are 
in trouble worldwide. Informal community and family-based arrangements are 
weakening. Formal programs are beset by escalating costs that drive tax levels and tax 
rates up, and because of the resulting market distortions, this weakens private sector 
growth. In addition, these same programs fail to protect the old. The report therefore 
issues a strong warning to developing countries not to follow in the footsteps of richer 
countries: “At the same time, many developing countries are on the verge of adopting 
the same programs that have spun out of control in middle- and high-income countries” 
(World Bank 1994, p. 1). The World Bank puts forward a host of arguments for why 
formal public programs are failing, and why they are unfair and unable to meet the 
demographic challenge.  
The demographic transformation that has resulted in increased numbers of 
dependent old people is central to the way in which the report frames the inadequacy of 
the existing formal system, which is built around one dominant public pillar of pension 
provision. The problem lies in the method of financing the system by means of Pay-As-
You-Go (PAYG) arrangements, whereby current outlays on pension benefits are paid 
out of current revenues. When the system is young, generous benefits to the first 
generation of retirees cost relatively little in terms of contributions and outlays. 
However, as the system matures and the population ages, the cost in terms of outlays 
increases due to the increase in the number of pensioners who expect steadily more 
generous benefits and the decrease in the number of people of working age who pay 
contributions. Thus, in a mandatory PAYG scheme, where saving, insurance and 
redistribution are combined within the same system of a dominant public pillar, 
problems arise as the system matures.1 This scheme is based on a defined benefit 
                                                 
1 These three core functions are specified as follows: Saving involves income smoothing over a person’s lifetime, i.e. 
people postpone some consumption when they are young so as to be able to draw on these savings when they are 
old. Redistribution involves shifting lifetime income between persons, “perhaps because if low-income workers saved 
enough to live on in old age, they would plunge below the poverty line when young.” In other words, because the 
ability to save is unequally distributed, redistribution is needed to secure some saving for all persons. The  Insurance 
function consists in protecting against the risks of recessions, bad investments or inflation that may reduce the 
value of the savings, the risk of outliving one’s own savings, or that public programs may fail (World Bank 1994, p. 
10.). 
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formula, since there is no clear connection between contributions and benefits among 
the three core functions mentioned above, i.e. there is no actuarial fairness in the 
scheme. For this reason, and due to the increasing cost burden, people tend to view 
these contributions as ordinary taxes rather than as the price for a specific service to be 
rendered. This perception leads to a vicious circle, where high tax rates encourage 
evasion, thus defeating the purpose of a mandatory scheme (i.e. where everyone has to 
contribute). At the same time, assuming that people are rational economic actors, they 
will attempt to benefit from the system by seeking to qualify for benefits without 
contributing the amount they ought to.  
The World Bank also maintains that high taxes have detrimental effects on economic 
growth, since they reallocate resources to the informal sector, thereby reducing output 
in the more efficient formal market sector of the economy. The existence of a PAYG 
system of funding crowds out private savings, since people expect that the government 
will pay their pensions, and this leads to reduced savings and smaller investments. In 
this way, the privilege of the first generation of beneficiaries, who do not need to save, is 
paid for by later generations in terms of lost investments and lower incomes. Moreover, 
high public spending on pensions crowds out other public growth-friendly investments. 
The end result is less economic growth and a smaller pie to be shared.  
The report sets out to debunk several recurrent myths in the pension debate. Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, all these myths concern the supposed efficiency and fairness of, 
and the need for, government social security programs. One of the myths the report 
aims to expose is the seemingly progressive and redistributive character of public social 
security programs. In a lifetime perspective, they argue, there is not much redistribution 
from lifetime rich to lifetime poor. This can be explained largely in terms of the 
difference in longevity between rich and poor. The rich live longer and therefore collect 
benefits over more years than the lifetime poor. A public earnings-related pension pillar, 
of the type familiar to us especially from the European context, is therefore a poor 
solution for those who want redistribution: 
“Ironically, the largest transfers go to high-income groups in earlier cohorts, 
whereas middle- and sometimes even lower-income groups in later cohorts get 
negative transfers. The larger and more earnings-related the benefits in the public 
pillar, the greater are these perverse effects” (World Bank 1994, p. 13).              
Given these inadequacies of existing pension systems, the question arises of what has to 
be done. The World Bank proposes a radical change in pension design by suggesting a 
three-pillar model of pension provision, in which the three core functions are separated. 
In this model the role of the public pillar is limited to the objective of alleviating old-age 
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poverty and insuring against various risks.2 It should be tax financed and modest in size 
so as to give scope for the other two pillars, while at the same time keeping tax rates 
low. Although the World Bank report offers different options for the design of the 
public scheme, it considers a variant of a means-tested scheme, in the form of a 
minimum pension guarantee, as the best way to hinder poverty in old age.  
The second pillar would have the objective of securing the saving function, while 
also providing coinsurance. It should take the form of a mandatory pillar fully funded 
and privately managed, preferably through personal plans, as this would give higher 
returns than poorly managed public funds. This pillar would be characterised by 
actuarial fairness; it would achieve symmetry between contributions and benefits, and 
would exclude any redistributive considerations. 
A third pillar, consisting of voluntary occupational and or personal savings plans, 
completes the pension provision by offering additional protection for those who want 
more income and insurance in their old age.3  
Normative bases: actuarial fairness and means-tested safety nets for 
the poor 
So what are the normative implications in terms of distributive justice of the 
international standards set by this global organisation? The basic assumption is that of 
actuarial fairness, whereby symmetry between individual contributions and outcomes in 
terms of pension benefits is the norm. In short, the efforts of individuals to participate 
via the free market should be reflected in the design of the pension scheme. Although 
the report severely criticises the perverse distributive outcomes of public schemes, the 
proposed alternative does not foresee any major effort to reduce income differences as 
such. Quite the contrary, redistributive efforts ought to restrict themselves to the limited 
goal of hindering poverty in old age. In this sense, benefits would be very modest at 
mere subsistence level and means tested in order to avoid as far as possible any 
distortions of the market system. There are therefore ostensible differences between this 
approach and the broader distributive aims and underlying logic of both the Nordic and 
                                                 
2 The poverty concept applied throughout this paper is a relative one. In comparing two countries as diverse as 
Norway and South Africa, poverty will have different meanings depending on the context. In 1997 the share of 
persons on low income, defined as income after tax per unit of consumption below 50% of median income, was 
4.7%. On average, old-age pensioners with minimum pensions had incomes of NOK 7,500 above the low income 
limit in 1996. The group of old-age pensioners made up 7% of the group of persons with low incomes. Their 
proportion (i.e. that of persons above 67 years of age) of the total population was 14.4% in 1990. Thus income 
poverty and low income is less of a problem in this group compared to some other population groups. A strong 
increase of the minimum pension in 1998 improved the income position of this group still further (St.meld nr 50 
1998–99). In South Africa 35.8% of the population fall below the income poverty line, defined as US $ 2 a day 
(1993 PPP US $) based on the period 1983–2000 (Human Development Report 2002, 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/indicator/). Thus these two ways of measuring poverty and low 
income reflect highly different economic and social contexts. For instance, in terms of PPP (purchasing power 
parity) gross national income per capita, the per capita for Norway was US $ 29,630 in 2000 and US $ 9,160 for 
South Africa (World Development Indicators 2002, http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/tables/table1-
1.pdf). Measurement of income poverty does not take into account informal and non-monetary forms of provision, 
a fact that adds to the situation of highly different national contexts to which these poverty indicators must be 
related.    
3 The three-pillar metaphor is well chosen because it evokes an image of stability and security, whereas if one or 
especially two of the pillars are missing there is a strong suggestion of lacking stability and security.  
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the continental European welfare states: “Against organised labour, against European 
corporatist social security structures and for the very poor: that is the political strategy 
of the dominant anti-poverty thinking in the Bank” (Deacon with Hulse and Stubbs 
1997, p. 69).4 In this way the report takes a clear stand in favour of a model of pensions 
and social policy which, in the literature on classification of welfare regimes and welfare 
states, is known variously as the Residual or Liberal type (cf. Titmuss 1974, Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Within this model the state plays a residual role by providing a safety 
net, in the form of a mere subsistence income, for those who for various reasons lose 
out in contending with the market system. Redistribution is limited to achieving this aim 
and no more. The other factor presupposed by the system is the provision of security by 
means of dominant market relations. The preferable system is therefore considered to 
be voluntary private pensions, since these allow freedom of contract and result in a 
conception of distributive justice that acknowledges individual economic efforts in 
terms of contributions, investment choices and risk taking. However, the World Bank 
does not pursue this ideal to its logical conclusion, insofar as it compromises freedom of 
choice in obtaining the goal of adequate savings. Thus the World Bank report represents 
a blend of strong belief in the distributive fairness of market institutions and the need 
for some hierarchical paternalism through mandatory saving and minimal redistribution 
through the tax system.       
T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o u r  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) offers a contrast to the neo-liberal 
policies of the World Bank and similar organisations, such as the IMF. The mission of 
the ILO is to set and keep common international social standards (Deacon, with Hulse 
and Stubbs 1997).  
The pension debate is one in which the ILO and the World Bank have differed 
substantially. In the ILO Summary on Social Security Pensions: Development and 
Reform (ILO 1999, Gillion 2000), the ILO’s point of departure is a historical 
perspective in which they see social security pensions as a major development.5 Yet 
there is a considerable contrast between the beginning of the last century, when there 
were no social security pensions and life was “nasty, short and brutish” (Gillion 2000, p. 
1), and the situation today, where levels of poverty among the elderly are comparable to 
those among other social groups in developed countries. Life expectancy for workers 
                                                 
4 Thus under the heading institutional winners and losers the report notes: “With the pension transition, managers of 
social security institutions will lose some of their power that comes with wielding monopolistic control over large 
flows of money, and workers in these institutions may lose their jobs. The social security bureaucrats may try to 
mobilize political parties and pressure groups to oppose the transition. Severance pay may help to defray their 
opposition. Private financial institutions gain, especially those that reap the large profits available to early entrants 
into the market, so they can be expected to lobby in favour of a decentralised funded pension system. In many 
Latin American countries unions may expect to lose and oppose the transition if they were previously the sole 
representatives of the workers in the social security program. Unions may be won over by letting them establish 
new pension funds as in Chile and Argentina” (World Bank 1994, p. 273). 
5 The ILO (1999) document is entitled “The Development and Reform of Social Security Pensions: The Approach of 
the International Labor Office” (Executive Summary), Geneva, ILO. The document I refer to here is an updated 
version (2000), with Colin Gillion, Director at the Social Security Department, as author.  
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has improved, and the introduction of disability pensions and early retirement schemes 
has reduced the economic risks associated with incapacity to work. In this respect:  
“A large part of this profound improvement in social conditions can be attributed 
to the creation of social security pensions which must be counted as one of the 
major social developments of the last hundred years” (Gillion 2000, p. 1). 
Even so, the ILO adds that the goal of social security has yet to be completed in a 
global or worldwide perspective.6 Coverage of social security pensions in developing 
countries is still very low and the organisation sees the extension of coverage to workers 
throughout the world as a major objective. Schemes must be developed which, in 
addition to broadening the coverage, are well governed, economically efficient and in 
line with international human and social values. Thus the core normative premise of the 
ILO is the fundamental right to economic security for all people, and this ought to be 
achieved by extending social security to provide a basic income to all in need of such 
protection. For the vast majority of retired and disabled people, as well as women and 
orphans around the world, this right is still denied. The ILO points out that, for these 
people, the key issue is lack of entitlement and not the basis for determining benefits.  
The concept of ‘crisis’ that is crucial to the World Bank is absent from the ILO’s 
characterisation of the situation. However, this does not mean an absence of challenges 
to pension schemes. The report notes that pension schemes around the world are in a 
state of transformation. The ILO identifies similar problem areas as those of the World 
Bank, such as the benefit structure, the financing of pension programs, including the 
management of investment, coverage and its shortfalls, governance and administration, 
problems of contribution evasion, redistributive issues etc. It is in their interpretation of 
causes that the two organisations differ. I shall briefly point out this difference within 
two areas.  
As mentioned above, in the World Bank policy story the PAYG system of financing 
is viewed as fundamentally flawed and due for replacement by pre-funding through the 
private sector by means of defined contribution schemes. The demographic 
transformation accentuates this flaw in the public system leading to unacceptable tax 
burdens. In addition, the World Bank report abounds with examples of poor public 
governance of pension funds and the corresponding superiority of private funding. The 
picture painted by the ILO is quite different. They acknowledge that demographic 
transformation represents a risk factor, but they argue that this does not constitute an 
argument for changing the system into one that requires defined contributions through 
private fund management: 
“…some of the perceptions about the operation of such a scheme are factually 
and analytically wrong. It would not reduce the burden (on the national economy 
and the population at large) of supporting an ageing population, unless pension 
benefits were reduced relative to income in work. But both these changes could 
                                                 
6 Deacon notes that the international context in which the ILO was established in 1919 involved the Bolshevik unrest 
sweeping Europe and the Treaty of Versailles, which was closely concerned with labour conditions: “the failure of 
any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries.” (Quoted in Woolcock 1995) (Quoted from Deacon, with Hulse 
and Stubbs 1997, p. 73). Since then the strategy of the ILO has been to exert moral pressure on governments to 
sign and ratify conventions of good practice.    
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also be achieved under a public social security scheme of the pay-as-you-go type. 
The reason is fairly straightforward. The standard of living of retirees can only be 
provided from the real incomes of those in work, whether this transfer takes place 
through a public mechanism or through market-based savings. If it is the former, 
contribution rates must be increased. If it is the latter, then the accumulated 
financial assets of pensioners must be sold to contributors in order to provide the 
pensioners with money for consumption. In both cases the amounts of money 
involved (contributions or mandatory savings) are equivalent. Both must react in 
the same way to increases in the proportion of pensioners to the active 
population” (Gillion 2000, p. 17). 
But even more important than this, the ILO has normative reasons for opposing the 
introduction of such a scheme, since defined contribution schemes do not provide 
predictable and guaranteed income. This is a fundamental principle of the ILO and one 
that they believe can only be accomplished within a defined benefit social security 
scheme. The World Bank would of course argue that, due to the political risks involved 
in public schemes, defined benefit schemes do not provide a basis for predictions or the 
provision of guarantees. Rather, they view such schemes as inherently unpredictable and 
insecure. This exposes a basic difference between the two organisations in terms of their 
trust in public and private institutions, and this is further evinced by their views on 
private pension management. Whereas the World Bank is highly critical of publicly 
managed funds and argues for the superiority of private funds, the view of the ILO is 
much more sceptical. Although the ILO mentions and warns against the politicisation 
of investments and admits that there are many examples of poorly managed government 
funds,7 they also provide examples of what they consider to be effectively managed 
funds, such as the public Quebec Pension Plan.8 Moreover, they add that OECD 
experience in the management of private pension funds suggests that the regulation of 
pension managers requires considerable care because of the obvious opportunities for 
insider dealing, whereby managers might improperly benefit themselves (Gillion 2000, p. 
5).  
For the World Bank the demographic transformation and the increasing pension 
burden created by the public PAYG system of financing create a problem of lacking 
fairness between generations, in that future generations face higher tax rates compared 
to earlier generations of taxpayers. A core argument here is that the private savings 
crowded out by PAYG schemes represent a lost opportunity for growth that would 
have created a larger pie for future generations to share. In this way the existing pension 
                                                 
7 The question of the politicisation of pension funds is an important one that overrides the public-private distinction. 
It is of course naïve to believe that large international pension funds with strong economic power would not try to 
use this to politically influence government policies in ways that suit their interests, whatever they may be. The 
other side of this is of course the processes of politicisation from within private pension funds. By this I mean the 
increasing pressure from various stakeholders to incorporate social, ecological and ethical concerns into the 
management of pension schemes, with regard to their investment policies. To the extent that such features of 
pension fund investment policies are realised, we can speak of a process whereby pension funds mimic the welfare 
state in terms of setting certain socially and ethically relevant standards that are not to be compromised, even in 
cases where the result would be lower rates of return on investments. So far, however, a study by Bernt Kasemir 
and Andrea Süess (2001) has revealed that pension funds investing in environmental projects in fact give higher 
returns than ordinary market investments.  
8 Experience with public management, such as that of the Norwegian National Insurance Fund or the Petroleum 
Fund, has also been good in terms of governance and investment returns. 
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system is creating growing conflicts between generations. Referring to the mixed and 
inconclusive results in the literature on this issue, the ILO disputes this view of the 
drawbacks of public savings, and maintains that the growing financial burden must be 
disassociated from the PAYG form of social security organization as such. The 
increased pension burden in the future does not point to any inherent lack of 
generational fairness in public social security schemes. The generational contract is 
sustainable so long as the compliance and trust of future taxpayers can be secured.            
In sum, the ILO points to two paramount problems. The first is the lack of coverage, 
which needs to be expanded to all people. The second is the importance of governance 
issues:  
“A well-designed social security programme can fail to meet its goals if it is poorly 
governed. Many of the problems of social security schemes in developing 
countries result from poor governance and can be resolved by improvements in 
governance rather than requiring major reforms” (Gillion 2000, p. 10).  
This is of course almost opposite to the conclusion arrived at by the World Bank, which 
recommends developing countries not to follow in the footsteps of the developed 
countries, especially those of Europe.  
A central concern for the ILO with regard to governance is that the tripartite 
structure of social security governance should be retained through the participation of 
governments, employers and employees. But this is exactly what the World Bank wants 
to do away with by transferring governance to private fund management and 
substantially reducing the influence of what they call the welfare bureaucracy and the 
unions. The notion of good governance therefore has clearly contrasted connotations 
within these two policy camps. The World Bank wants to depoliticise pension 
governance by securing far greater scope for market-based pension provision. The ILO 
wants to enable the participation of stakeholders in order to secure democratic 
governance of pension schemes. 
Normative bases: universal coverage and redistributive social 
insurance fairness  
The ILO is quite explicit about the normative basis for its policy guidelines. It names 
five central elements: the extension of coverage to all members of the population, 
protection against poverty for all members of the population, provision of income 
replacements for lost earnings due to retirement for all those who have contributed, 
adjustment of income to take account of inflation and (to some extent) improvements 
in living standards, and finally the creation of an environment for additional voluntary 
provisions. In addition, the ILO stresses the importance of principles of compulsory 
affiliation, equality of treatment, guaranteed and predictable benefits, democratic 
management, and the responsibility of the state to ensure that the conditions for the 
delivery of benefits are fulfilled (Gillion 2000). To accomplish this the organisation 
stresses the need to develop pluralistic designs and flexible structures, since there is no 
such thing as a universal and perfect retirement income scheme. Pension schemes have 
to adapt and change to suit altered economic and social circumstances. In order to 
reduce poverty and provide low risk retirement income, pension schemes must be 
redistributive and benefits must be provided from diversified sources. The ILO 
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therefore advocates a four-tiered system. Firstly, there is an anti-poverty, means-tested 
or universal tier, financed from general revenues; the second tier is a PAYG 
arrangement with defined benefits; the third is a mandatory defined contribution 
component; the fourth and final tier encompasses voluntary savings and non-pension 
sources of income.9 By applying the concept of tiers to emphasise the basic 
interconnectedness of the different sources of retirement provision, the ILO offers a 
visualization of the pension system that is different from the separate pillar identities of 
the World Bank conceptualisation. The ILO foresees a much stronger role for public 
provision than does the World Bank, insofar as the first two tiers would be based on 
general taxation and PAYG financing, with the second tier of the defined benefit kind. 
It is the second tier that represents the strongest divergences in normative terms 
between the two organisations. The ILO wants to keep a redistributive mandatory 
defined benefit tier, of the kind that is now traditional in OECD countries. Here the 
World Bank presents a much clearer break with the existing system, by setting up a 
second mandatory pillar that does not involve redistribution and which is based on 
defined contributions to a privately managed funded system. However, the ILO also 
adds a mandatory defined contribution tier that may or may not be privately managed.  
The most important normative principle of the ILO proposal is the universal coverage 
of pension schemes. This is premised on notions of basic social rights and social justice. 
To enforce such principles, compliance through a mandatory and redistributive social 
insurance scheme is needed. With regard to the design of pension schemes, the ILO 
proposal is close to existing schemes within the OECD countries, although it also 
includes mechanisms to accommodate increasing diversification through defined 
contribution elements and voluntary additions.  
Local/national  solutions:  Norway and 
South Afr ica  
In this section I shall present the existing pension landscape of Norway and outline 
some of the normative bases of its National Insurance system. This section will draw on 
previous writings about the Norwegian case (Ervik 2002a, 2002b). The presentation of 
the South African case will be only cursory.  
N o r w a y :  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p l u r a l i s m ,  
u n i v e r s a l i s m  a n d  s o c i a l  d i v i s i o n s  
At present, the pension landscape in Norway reveals a situation that combines plural 
sources of income security for the elderly. A universal and fairly generous first tier of 
pension provision is combined with other tiers of income sources, as well as a public 
                                                 
9 Although the ILO applies the concept of a means-tested basic pension, in discussing the extension of coverage to 
the informal sector the organisation opens the way for other policy options, such as tax-based universal schemes. 
Cf. for instance the ILO/SAMAT paper by Fultz and Pieris (1999) on social security schemes in Southern Africa.  
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system of service provision for old people. There is, however, a social division, since 
groups within the private sector do not have access to occupational pensions. 
In 1966 Norway introduced a comprehensive National Insurance (NI) reform, the 
so-called Folketrygden. This incorporated the formerly separate insurance systems 
covering old age, disability, sickness, unemployment and compensation for families with 
children within a single institution. Since the introduction of this reform, old age 
pensions have also provided income-related benefits. As a result of Folketrygden, the 
Norwegian public pension system now has the following hallmarks. The system is 
universal. Every residents of Norway (minimum 3 years of residence) has the right to a 
basic pension (Grunnpensjon) independent of labour market participation. Those with 
incomes from employment, above a certain minimum, also receive an additional 
earnings-related pension (Tilleggspensjon). The public pension system is redistributive. It 
redistributes income from lifetime rich to lifetime poor. Through the PAYG system of 
financing based on general taxes the system also encompasses vertical redistribution, 
through the application of a system of progressive tax rates.10  
For average wage earners, the replacement ratio of the NI is around 50 percent 
before tax (Herbertsson, Orszag & Orszag 2000). Taking into account the effect of the 
tax system, replacement rates as percentage of previous net income are higher. For an 
industrial worker on average income in 1995, the replacement rate was close to two 
thirds of previous net income (St.meld nr 35 1994–95). For below-average incomes, the 
net replacement rate is higher than two thirds, while for above-average incomes it is 
lower (cf. Table 1 below).  
However, Norway’s pension system consists of more than just the National 
Insurance system; it also encompasses occupational and private pensions. Table 1 gives 
an account of the institutional mix of the current pension system, based on the three 
tiers, and describes some of its most important dimensions: 
                                                 
10 Since contributions are paid also on income above the ceiling where no pension benefits are earned, this also 
contributes to the vertical redistributive function of the pension system. 
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Table 1. Pension tier mix: coverage, replacement levels, retirement ages, financing, and income 
composition. 
  First tier Second tier Third tier 
Type of pension Public pension tier: 
National Insurance. 
Public earnings related part of 
National Insurance scheme and 
occupational pensions within the 
public and private sectors. 
Private pensions. 
Coverage Universal: all residents 
with a minimum of 3 
years of residence 
receive the basic 
pension. 
Both sectors: 1970: 41% of all 
employees; 1989: 58% of all 
employees; 1998: 53% of all 
employees. 
Public sector: near complete.  
Private sector: 1998: 34%.  
1984: 166,860 schemes; 
1992: 250,000 tax 
favoured schemes; 
1998: 698,000 schemes 
including non-tax favoured 
policies. 
Replacement levels National Insurance, 
including 
supplementary 
pension: single 
pensioner with 
previous average 
income (5G11) and 40 
years of earnings. 
Gross income 
replacement level 
1995: 54%. Net 
income replacement 
level 1995:  67%. 
Income 12G: Gross 
replacement level: c. 
33%. Net replacement 
level: c. 45%.           
(1G= NOK 38,080. As 
of May 1, 2001 1G= 
NOK 51,360). 
Public sector: 66% of final salary. 
(The right to a full pension 
demands 30 years of earning.) 
Private sector: 60–70% of final 
salary most common. 
 
Varies depending on 
contributions. Within tax 
favoured schemes a 
maximum of NOK 40,000 
are tax deductible each 
year, as of 2002.  
 
Retirement age 67 years 67 years. Within public sector 
specific retirement ages for 
certain categories of employees. 
67 years for tax favoured 
schemes, no rules for 
others. 
Financing Contributions, taxes, 
PAYG 
Public sector: contributions, un-
funded for state 
employees.Contributions, funded 
for communal employees. Private 
sector: contributions, funded. 
Contributions, funded. 
Composition of old 
age pensioners 
income  
Share 1982:  73.9%. 
Share 1992:  63.2%.  
Occupational pensions, both 
sectors: 1982: 9.7%; 1992: 
15.2%; 1995: c. 18%. 
Capital incomes and other 
incomes: 1982: 16.4%; 
1992: 21.6%. 
Source: Finansnæringenes Hovedorganisasjon (2000) Herbertsson, Orzag & Orzag (2000), Hippe & 
Pedersen (1991), NOU 1994:2, NOU 1999: 32, St.meld nr 35 (1994–95), Pedersen (2000). 
                                                 
11 The basic amount (Grunnbeløpet, or G for short) is adjusted by parliament once or more often each year. It serves as 
the basis for the calculation of benefits as well as contributions. There is no automatic indexation of the basic 
amount. 
WORKING  PAPER 8 – 2003 GLOBAL  NORMATIVE  STANDARDS AND NATIONAL  SOLUTIONS  
18 
To complete the above picture we should also take into account other sources of 
income and service provision. Home ownership represents a strong savings instrument 
in Norway. It is also associated with substantial tax incentives from the state (Ervik 
2000). Among older people home-ownership rates exceed 90%. The government 
provides universal social services and health care for older people. In a comparative 
perspective, the Scandinavian countries are unique in that these services are provided 
through governmental organisations to a greater degree than they are in other types of 
welfare state (Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000). 
The broad agreement on the Folketrygd system among the political parties created an 
atmosphere favourable to an expansion of the benefits offered. Thus during the 1970s a 
special supplement was introduced to compensate older members of the labour force, 
the retirement age was reduced from 70 to 67 years, earnings-related pensions for those 
with higher incomes were increased, incomes from employer contributions were also 
reduced, and finally, in 1979, contributions to the National Insurance fund were 
completely terminated (Seip 1994, Øverbye 1990, Kolberg 1983). Together these 
developments strengthened the PAYG profile of the system, with levels of financing 
from general transfers of tax revenues increasing relative to the financing from employer 
and employee contributions, thus enhancing the role of the state.  
In addition to these developments in the public pension system, Table 1 shows that 
occupational pension arrangements have also expanded. From 1970 to 1989 
membership rates in labour market occupational pension schemes increased from 41% 
to 58% of all employees. In numerical terms, such memberships have doubled (Hippe & 
Pedersen 1991). Figures for 1998 suggest the coverage is lower, about 53% (NOU 1999: 
32, p. 107).12 However, whereas coverage of occupational pensions is almost complete 
in the public sector, in the private sector it is much lower. In 1998 coverage was 
approximately 34% (465,000 workers) of private sector workers (Herbertsson, Orszag & 
Orszag 2000).13  
The market for private individual pensions has also expanded substantially. In 1984 
the number of pension insurance contracts was 166,860. By the end of 1998 there were 
698,000 individual pension policies. Of these 160,000 were paying benefits. Assuming 
that each policy is held by a different individual, the total number of policies accounts 
for 20.3% of residents aged 17 or older in 1998 (FNH 2000).14 The growth in the 
number of insurance contracts between 1984 and 1998 amounted to over 400%.  
                                                 
12 Pedersen (2000) reports a higher rate of 60%, based on wage earners aged 59 or less.  
13 Besides the division of public and private coverage there are also social divisions within the private sector. 
Coverage and quality of pensions in terms of replacement rates are highest within the financial sector and lowest 
within retail and the wholesale trade, hotels and restaurants. Coverage in the former industry was 93.3%, but only 
28.6% in the latter. The latter industries are characteristically labour intensive, with modest wage levels, large 
turnover, widespread use of part-time contracts and a high proportion of female employees (Pedersen 2000). 
14 This calculation assumes that different persons own individual pension insurance policies. According to the chief 
actuary of the FNH this may not be so. Not all companies manage to record statistics for each person, so the 
numbers above are per insurance contract. If the same person has contracts in different companies these are not 
conflated in the statistics (Personal correspondence October 2000). The number above thus overstates the relative 
number of persons actually covered. 
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Following this description of the pension system, I shall now outline some of the 
normative underpinnings of the National Insurance system. Here I shall draw upon and 
present the main findings of an earlier analysis based on parliamentary debates and other 
public documents from around the time of the NI’s initiation in 1966 (Ervik 2002a).  
Firstly, this analysis demonstrated the value of equality and universality as a shared 
normative foundation. Each individual is to be treated equally and is to have equal 
access to the social security provided by the scheme.  
Secondly, it is insisted that security (or lack of security) is a social problem that 
belongs to the public sphere and ought to be addressed as a collective responsibility. 
This view applies not only to basic security but also to standard security. Emphasis is 
laid on the aspect that, as an institution, Folketrygd is a product of collective effort, which 
embodies a form of social solidarity. This can be seen in formulations such as “the 
Norwegian people” and “all our people”, which convey the idea of the state’s 
responsibility and the inclusiveness of the security scheme. The name of the institution, 
Folketrygd – which, translated literally, means ‘people’s security/safety’ rather than 
‘National Insurance’ – also carries a sense of the scheme’s collective and universal 
nature. Redistributive intervention by the public hand was also justified by drawing 
attention to the social or cooperative character of production via the use of terms such 
as “our common goods” and “those means available to society for consumption”, 
phrases that imply the possibility of democratic control of distribution outside the 
market.  
Thirdly, there is a strong focus on the universal social rights of the individual. In 
other words, the institution is established to satisfy the individual’s need for and right to 
security, and since this need is universal in status, it applies equally to all members of 
society. However, we also see a close connection between the social right and the 
compulsory element, insofar as everyone is obliged to become a member of the system. 
This means there is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the institution, 
which allows us to regard it as a social contract. Where the standard security element is 
concerned, this reciprocity seems evident, in that contributions and benefits are linked 
together through the benefit formula. With regard to the universal minimum, the 
reciprocity cannot be constituted in narrow monetary terms. But insofar as reciprocity 
can accommodate differences in ability to pay or contribute, it allows us to view “non-
contributors” as fulfilling their duty just as much as “contributors”. This points to the 
essential ambiguity and contested nature of concepts such as ‘reciprocity’ and 
‘contribution’ (Kildal 1999, Ervik 2001).  
A final point should be made concerning the concept of freedom. The libertarian 
insistence that redistribution by state institutions is unjust and restricts individual liberty 
(O’Neill 2000) did not figure in the debate on National Insurance in Norway. What we 
do find is a notion of freedom as a positive value. Thus the Nordic historical and 
cultural legacy, which sees the state as conducive to individual freedom rather than as an 
oppressive institution (cf. Stråth & Sørensen 1997, Trägård 1997), seems to have been 
acknowledged also among the politicians who worked on the National Insurance 
reform.       
Not only was the National Insurance an institution that represented social justice and 
provided individual freedom, it was also seen as a rational way of providing security, 
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insofar as its administrative costs would be lower than those of so many fragmented 
occupational and private schemes.  
In summing up the aspect of distributive fairness on which the National Insurance 
system is based, we can say that it reconciles different logics of distributive justice within 
one and the same social security scheme. The institution was pragmatic in trying to 
some extent to unify opposing normative principles. In its insistence on actuarial fair 
premiums, it did not follow the logic of individual/private insurance to its extreme, but 
rather gave credit to those with higher incomes in ways that provided them with higher 
pension benefits. On the other hand, it also avoided a purely redistributive scheme that 
insists on equality of outcomes. The only non-compromised principle was that of the 
universalism that accords coverage and the right to a basic income to all people in old 
age. If we think in terms of adequacy, we find that here as well a pragmatic balance has 
been struck concerning the definition of what constitutes a sufficient minimum of basic 
security. Thus the substance of universalism was balanced or compromised against the 
fairness ideal of the contribution-based element, with both principles having to be 
adapted to the overall national economy. 
Given this account, it is justifiable to see the National Insurance as combining a basic 
social right to income security in old age with plural principles of distributive fairness. 
S o u t h  A f r i c a   
The South African pension system can also be portrayed as a multi-pillar or multi-tier 
system of pension provision. There is a public tier in the form of the non-contributory 
means-tested benefit SOAP (State Old Age Pension). Pension benefits are granted to 
women from the age of 60 and to men from 65, with the amount depending on the 
income and assets of the recipient. The maximum payable amount is the SA Rand 
equivalent of just under US$ 100 (about 10% of average earnings in manufacturing). 
The system was initially designed to benefit a small section of the population, mostly 
poor whites. Since the political power shift in 1994 the benefit has ceased to be linked 
to race and is now delivered widely, using the latest cash dispenser and security 
technology, even in rural areas (ILO 2002).15 This old-age pension helps to reduce 
poverty: “The SOAP reduces the poverty gap for pensioners by 94 percent. Poor 
households that include pensioners are on average significantly less poor than 
households without pensioners” (Report of the Committee of Inquiry Into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, Quoted from Olivier, Mpedi 
and Dekker 2002, p. 10).  
                                                 
15 In 1982 the differentials based on race were as follows: R1 for African, R5 for coloured and Indians, and R10 for 
whites as of 1982. Prior to 1996, coverage in South Africa extended to both citizens and permanent residents. The 
Social Security Assistance Act of 1992 eliminated the status of permanent non-national resident. This restriction 
was implemented in regulations by the Welfare Department as of March 1996. This policy change was imposed 
because of increasing numbers of migrant workers from neighbouring countries who sought to qualify for the old-
age pension (Fultz and Pieris 1999). This shows how social security arrangements in one country may impact 
behaviour in other countries, thus there is a basic international, regional and global aspect of social security that 
implies a need for global and regional governance and cooperation. And again this reveals the continued relevance 
of the preamble of the ILO’s founding document (1919, cf. note 5 above).  
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 There is also an occupationally based pension tier, but this has only low coverage 
within the formally employed work force. Coverage varies widely between different 
employment sectors, so in general those who receive the highest incomes are more 
widely covered than those in low-paid sectors of the economy. On average the 
occupational tier covers 10–20% of the formally employed. The schemes are tax 
favoured, meaning that the state sector is involved in financing through tax expenditure, 
or fiscal welfare, as Titmuss (1963) has called this welfare channel, and this has 
implications for redistribution and revenue losses.  
 A major difference from OECD countries is the existence of a large informal sector 
of the economy, where no social insurance schemes exist, apart from the social security 
scheme of SOAP that manages to reach across both the formal and the informal sector 
of the economy. However, whereas formal social security arrangements, especially social 
insurance, achieves only low coverage, informal social security is important in South 
Africa. Informal social security encompasses social security for informal workers, 
informal kinship-based forms of social security (i.e. the extended family and community 
network), and non-kinship forms of security such as urban reciprocal networks and 
market associations (Olivier, Mpedi and Dekker 2002). These forms of security, and 
especially those associated with the concept of the traditional family, represent a first 
line of defence. Given the low coverage of formal provisions, this is in effect the most 
important form of social security for most people in South Africa. Concentrating on the 
pension aspect of the social security landscape, this provides us with a model in which 
formal income security schemes coexist alongside informal forms of security. As regards 
the formal elements, what we have is a residual pension model, where the public system 
aims primarily to reduce poverty in old age by targeting those most in need through an 
income and assets test. However, in the context of South Africa, where the poor is a 
large group, old-age poverty reduction is a more considerable goal than in OECD 
countries today. As for the other formal tiers of pension provision, occupational 
pensions are a privilege enjoyed by only a small fraction of those employed within the 
formal sector of the economy. Pensions are therefore associated with a strong social 
division in terms of welfare, with only a small minority receiving adequate pensions. 
Adding informal social security, coverage is extended to many more people, in effect, all 
those who belong to a family/kinship system or a non-kinship social security network. 
But here as well, some people are still excluded, namely those who lack family ties or are 
not included in non-kinship systems of support. For older people these informal 
organisations are likely to provide care and material resources. But it is difficult to assess 
the adequacy of these informal provisions. 
Conclusions  
This paper has addressed the policy stories and policy advice of the World Bank and the 
ILO as important actors in the global discourse on the future of social security. The first 
conclusion we can draw is that there is a diversity of normative standards at the level of 
international and global actors, a diversity that is not done justice to in this account, 
which does not discuss the role of NGOs and other actors.  
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Secondly, the paper has illustrated how the normative solutions provided are 
interwoven with the overall framing that the organisations provide in terms of problem 
definitions and the conceptual tools that are applied. Given that there is disagreement 
about the true nature of the pension problem, in terms of both the facts and their 
possible implications, it is important that we become aware of the political and 
normative values that people and policy makers want the pension system to fulfil, 
before we look at the standard setting of international and global actors.  
This comparative account has also revealed that the global standards set by these 
organisations are not significantly different from many of the actual pension systems 
(public and private) employed around the world today, especially within OECD 
countries. Table 2 sums up some of the normative elements involved in the 
international standard setting of the World Bank and the ILO, and the elements of 
distributive fairness present in the existing systems of pension provision in Norway and 
South Africa. 
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Table 2. Comparison of the concepts of distributive justice in international organisations and national 
(public) pension schemes. Preliminary account 
Organisations and 
countries: 
Selected aspects 
of distributive 
justice: 
World Bank ILO Norway South Africa 
Coverage Means-tested 
safety net for the 
poor, and 
mandatory 
coverage for 
employees. 
Means-tested or 
universal safety net 
and mandatory 
coverage for 
employees. 
Universal safety 
net and mandatory 
coverage for 
employees. Since 
1991 unpaid care 
work earns 
pensions points. 
Means-tested 
safety net, no 
mandatory 
coverage for 
employees. 
Redistribution Limited to 
poverty 
reduction. 
Poverty reduction and 
broad income 
redistribution. 
Poverty reduction 
and broad income 
distribution: 
“Taming of 
inequality in 
retirement” 
(Pedersen 1999). 
Poverty 
reduction. 
Adequacy Low, subsistence 
level for the 
poor, for 
employees 
adequacy 
depends on 
contribution and 
market 
performance of 
funds. 
Above poverty level 
for the poor? Defined 
benefit reflecting 
previous earnings with 
redistribution for 
employees. 
Above poverty 
level (basic 
security) defined 
benefit with 
redistribution for 
employees 
(standard 
security). 
Low and 
inadequate, 
but succeeding 
in reducing 
poverty gaps in 
old age. 
Ideal pension 
scheme 
The private 
pension 
insurance 
contract. 
Broadly 
based/universal social 
security/insurance 
scheme. 
Broadly based 
/universal social 
security. 
? (But see last 
cell) 
Trust in 
institutions 
Basic trust in 
market 
institutions, 
distrust in public 
state 
institutions. 
Basic trust in public 
state and corporative 
institutions, distrust in 
markets. 
Strong trust in 
state institutions. 
Low trust in 
state 
institutions, 
high trust in 
market, and 
trust in 
informal 
society? 
Basic 
philosophical 
approach and 
key concepts 
for fairness 
evaluation 
Libertarian 
contractual 
theories (with 
modification), 
actuarial 
fairness. 
Fairness based on a 
social justice 
perspective: positive 
universal liberty 
rights. 
Fairness based on 
a social justice 
perspective: 
positive universal 
liberty rights. 
? (But see 
below) 
Basic welfare 
system logic 
Residual/liberal. Universal/institutional/ 
social democratic.  
Universal 
/institutional/social 
democratic. 
Mixed: residual 
at present, but 
with 
constitutional 
commitment to 
universal social 
and economic 
rights.  
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The scheme designs of the two international organisations have different implications 
for social inequalities and the development of identities that enhance broad national 
solidarity. The World Bank’s three-pillar design assumes a narrow view of the role of 
public schemes in providing safety nets for the poor, but sees no justification for more 
encompassing redistribution to reduce overall social inequalities due to differences in 
income. In this regard, the designs of both the ILO’s pension scheme and the 
Norwegian National Insurance institution have the more ambitious redistributive aim 
not only of avoiding poverty in retirement, but also of ensuring that social distances 
among retired people due to different incomes do not become too wide, in other words, 
they seek to achieve a fairly egalitarian distribution of incomes. 
As the table above reveals, I have not managed to tease out the underlying principles 
of the South African case. Within the academic policy debate there are various views on 
how the country’s social security will develop. One important theme of this debate is the 
future role of informal social security. According to Olivier, Mpedi and Dekker (2002) 
these systems of informal security “are characterised by a support network, based on a 
strong sense of solidarity and on the premise of reciprocity” (op. cit., p. 4). In addition, 
they point out (cf. Table 2, p. 9) that these informal organisations have a bottom-up 
mode of operation, and that in terms of incentives these involve social norms and 
values, altruistic behaviour, charity and self-interest, while in terms of sanctions they 
involve social pressures and the inherent family contract. More to the point, these 
informal security arrangements are expressions of what are called ‘African traditional 
values’: 
“It is on account of these values (which are all about solidarity, collective 
responsibility, compassion, equality, unity, self-determination, human respect and 
human dignity) that individuals subsist as families and that families become closely 
interlaced communities which form a large society… African traditional values 
such as ubuntu and harambee constitute the basis of informal social security in 
Africa” (op. cit., p. 12).16 
Accordingly, the informal social security system represents not only a functional 
equivalent to formal social security, it is in fact more comprehensive, in that it meets 
more contingencies than formal social security. And to the extent that the above 
description reflects the reality of how these systems function, they also seem at least 
partially adequate in addressing certain needs, such as those for care and material 
provision in old age. However the authors point out that these informal systems face 
challenges, such as urbanisation and AIDS, that weaken their capacity. In addition, the 
authors warn, “resources and energy are increasingly being devoted to formal social 
security, to the detriment of informal social security” (op. cit., pp. 3–4). Since informal 
social security is basically seen as a way of life, it may be threatened by the expansion of 
formal social security. Therefore, in suggesting policies for the future, these authors 
                                                 
16 These values differ from those identified as Western values, such as these are reflected in for instance business life. 
Thus the following contrasts are found between African traditional values and the West:  community above 
individuals, external not internal control, supportiveness above competition, people, not workers/staff, qualitative 
time (versus quantitative time), leadership through care and integrity, not power and status, holistic wealth, i.e. 
“what is the point of success in business if it does not lead to cordial relationships, if wealth is not available and 
beneficial to all?” (cf. note 41, op. cit., p. 13).  
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advocate that government and private players should support the development of 
informal social security and should provide means to accommodate informal social 
security within formal systems.  
Other voices in the debate take a more critical stance towards informal social 
security, especially regarding the position of women within this framework. In a critical 
analysis of the White Paper on Social Welfare (WPSW) (1996), Sevenhuijsen, Bozalek, 
Gouws and Minnaar-McDonald (2003) argue that it represents a familialist and gender-
blind perspective: 
“Compared to the relative space that is devoted to women and other ‘special 
groups’ it is in fact rather astonishing how little is said about men as a social 
group. Apart from the passages where they are addressed as ‘stakeholders’ in 
domestic and familial responsibilities, WPSW is silent on the social problems 
caused by masculine behaviour. Despite mentioning family violence against 
women and children, a problem that is indeed highly prevalent in South Africa, 
the report doesn’t discuss how this might be caused by specific conceptions of 
masculine behaviour. There is no thorough discussion of male negligence and 
neglect (refusal to pay child support, for example) and the abandonment of wives 
and children … By this invisibility of men in the document, women are in fact 
targeted as the individuals who have the responsibility of solving large-scale social 
and political problems, while men remain relatively off the hook” (Sevenhuijsen, 
Bozalek, Gouws and Minnaar-McDonald 2003, p. 16). 
This description raises two problems concerning the adequacy and capacity of the social 
security aspect of the family, namely, violence and neglect, and the implicit contract 
between genders. Both problems could be conceptualised as problems of compliance as 
we know them from formal social security schemes. In both cases, lack of compliance 
causes problems for the viability of the scheme. Violence and neglect create insecurity. 
Or, to mention a different example, women who choose education in order to be able 
to participate in the formal labour market may find their capacity for informal care work 
reduced. What this means is that we need to take into account the basic plurality of 
existing ways of life in South Africa, just as we should in Norway and other countries. 
This is not to deny the existence of African traditional values as a form of life, but just 
to point out that there is more to the situation than just that, and that women who 
choose other ways of life may have legitimate reasons for doing so.  
Another perspective adds to this plurality, namely, that of social rights such as they 
are expressed, for instance, in the Constitution of 1996, where the Bill of Rights 
incorporates a comprehensive set of social and economic rights (Archer 2002). Within 
this perspective, people have rights as individuals to relevant goods. Further, “the state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures to provide these material rights 
within the limits set by available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
these rights” (Sunstein 2001, p. 4). This way of thinking is closer to the social justice 
perspective of the ILO recommendations on pension systems and the Norwegian 
National Insurance, as discussed above.    
Voices representing the World Bank view, with its much more limited role for the 
state in providing a modest means-tested safety net and its correspondingly expanded 
position of market provision, will most probably be found in the South-African context 
as well, for instance among private pension providers. A central argument for the 
framework advocated by these voices, visible in the debate at both the global and 
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national levels (in Norway and South Africa), is that universal public programs involving 
tax payments and revenue requirements are very costly. And it is certainly the case that 
the universalism that offers fairly general benefits and broad coverage is demanding on 
people, requiring their compliance in paying taxes. Moreover, such universalism is 
premised on a situation of close to full employment and high labour market 
participation of both men and women. However, in my view the preoccupation with 
public costs fails to address the costs of the alternatives, i.e. of systems involving low 
taxation and public expenditure and little or no redistribution, and/or systems where 
costs fall on other components of social security, such as occupational, market-based 
and informal elements.  
This is an important issue to address in the context of South Africa, where the 
distribution of incomes and property is so unequal. In South Africa the richest 20% of 
the population control nearly 70% of the national income and poverty rates are in the 
range of 30–40% (Fultz and Pieris 1999, p. 10, cf. also Terreblanche 2002, pp. 30–44).17 
This may impact the present distribution of resources within the informal sector. Since 
the informal sector is mainly based on family and kinship or neighbourhood networks, 
i.e. on local private relations and material resources, the scope for pooling resources 
more widely is not available and the redistribution that takes place will reflect, yet not 
affect, the overall situation of vast distributional inequities in the national context.18  
From a social justice perspective this is a strong argument in favour of enhancing the 
overall redistributive capacity by raising taxes and expanding public budgets. The 
implementation of such measures would, however, not be an easy task. It would require 
among other things a trust in state institutions, the compliance of taxpayers and an 
increasing formalisation of the economy that may take decades to accomplish in the 
South African case. It would also require the building of trust and solidarity across 
existing social divisions and an understanding of the economic outcomes in a society as 
representations of communal cooperation, where everyone has contributed (in a broad 
sense) and is thus entitled to a fair share. But although this would not be an easy goal to 
achieve, that does not mean that it would be impossible or that it is not worth trying. 
On the one hand, social security for all may be conditioned by a relatively egalitarian 
social structure, but on the other, broad social security provision is also a means towards 
that end.  
Within this perspective it is also clear that questions of effective and efficient social 
security provisioning presuppose or are embedded in our conceptualisation of a just 
social order. In other words, we are concerned here with the question of what we mean 
when we say that burdens and benefits in a society ought to be shared in a fair way. 
                                                 
17 In economic terms and compared with the other SADC countries, South Africa has the second highest real GNP 
per capita with $7,490 (1997) of the area with Mauritius on top with $9,360 (Fultz and Pieris 1999, p. 8).      
18 This also raises the issue of global inequality in the field of social security and the question of an increased global 
responsibility for providing social security. In the respective texts published by the two organisations analysed here 
this issue is not raised. For instance the World Bank urges private pension funds to invest globally and diversify 
their portfolios so as to increase global interconnectedness, but this has no implications for the diversification of 
responsibility, which still rests with the national state. In addition, national demographic burdens are impacted by 
migration flows. This interconnectedness between pension systems adds a global dimension to the distributive 
justice aspect of social security.  
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This paper has provided only a preliminary clarification of the normative standard 
setting of the two international organisations in question, based on their general outlook 
on pensions. Further research is needed to account for their role as standard setters in 
national settings. Specific country studies made by these organisations to see how 
international standards are transformed into more practical policy recommendations 
offer one avenue of investigation. In addition, national policy debates, in which these 
international normative standards may gain currency, and the actors who advocate or 
resist such standards, must also be scrutinized. In both South Africa and Norway 
pension reform is currently on the political agenda and could serve as interesting cases 
for the analysis of the role played by international organisations in this context. 
Assessing the influence of international organisations on such reform processes is, 
however, a difficult business, since it involves inherently complex patterns, and we must 
allow for interaction and diffusion between and from both levels, i.e. from the global to 
the local/national as well as from the local to the global level.  
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